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ANTITRUST ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
John T. Chadwell* 
THE importance of the nation's antitrust policy requires that ad-ministration and enforcement powers and techniques be equal to 
the huge task of effectively safeguarding competition. The recommen-
dations of the Attorney General's Committee represent a statesman-
like effort to balance the need for effective enforcement with the need 
for the preservation of fairness and the conservation of time and re-
sources in antitrust litigation. Some of the recommendations will un-
doubtedly engender heated controversy; others seem relatively uncon-
troversial. 
Many individual topics are dealt with in the Report of the com-
mittee and space does not permit comment upon all of them. The 
following discussion is confined to what would seem to be the most 
important aspects of the committee's work on administration and en-
forcement. The section of the Report is divided into four parts, and 
the comments made here follow the same organization: (I) The De-
partment of Justice; (2) The Federal Trade Commission; (3) Related 
Jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission; and ( 4) Private Antitrust Suits. 
A. The Department of Justice 
Of the three sources of antitrust enforcement (Department of 
Justice, Federal Trade Commission and private litigants), Department 
of Justice proceedings command the most attention in the Report. 
Armed with the right to invoke the grand jury in Sherma:i:i Act cases 
and to call forth the full equity powers of the court in both Sherman 
and Clayton Act cases, the department possesses enormous powers of 
investigation and prosecution. The procedures under which it initiates 
investigations and prosecutes litigation necessarily merit the most care-
ful scrutiny. The Report deals with the functioning of these pro-
cedures at their successive stages. 
I. Antitrust Investigations 
If there is to be antitrust enforcement, both the prosecutor and the 
prosecuted have a stake in adequate investigative techniques. Insuf-
"" Member, lliinois Bar.-Ed. 
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ficient investigative powers for the prosecutor may frustrate enforce-
ment. But equally great is the danger, as the committee notes, that 
poor investigation may result in the ill-considered filing of suits which 
would not be brought at all if the prosecutor possessed the facts. Thus 
a "futile trial" may occur, "exhausting the resources of the litigants 
and increasing court congestion."1 Although such abortive use of law 
suits is a hazard in all kinds of litigation, it is a peculiarly da:n,gerous 
one in the antitrust field with its notoriously protracted and expensive 
trials. Consequently both government and industry have a common 
interest in the investigative powers and procedures of the Department 
of Justice. 
The question is whether the department's investigative powers 
are presently sufficient, or whether changes are needed. The commit-
tee points out that the availability of the grand jury for criminal pro-
ceedings under the Sherman, Act now gives the department ample 
powers for a full investigation.2 As a civil investigator, however, the 
department theoretically has no greater pre-complaint investigative 
powers than any private litigant. It possesses none of the civil pre-
complaint powers enjoyed by its sister enforcement agency, the Federal 
Trade Commission.3 It must rely upon the voluntary cooperation of 
.those under investigation, upon information obtained from third 
persons, and upon its own investigative ingenuity, without benefit of 
compulsory process. Cooperation is most often forthcoming.4 This 
1 R:sPoRT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL CoMMITTEE To STUDY THE 
ANTITRUST LAws, March 31, 1955, p. 344 (hereinafter referred to as REPORT, followed 
by the page number). 
2 "A federal grand jury is perhaps the most powerful inquisitorial body in a free coun-
try." Nitschke, "Procedure in Antitrust Investigations," 1950 UNIV. ILL. L. FoRUM 593 
at 604. On grand jury proceedings in antitrust cases, see Wadmond, "Investigation," 
A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, 32 at 42; Hollabaugh, "Develop-
ment of an Antitrust Case," A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, April 1-2, 1954, p. 14 
at 18. 
8 The Federal Trade Commission Act states that the commission may require reports 
under oath (§6), may have access to and the right to copy corporate documents (§9) and 
may compel the testimony of witnesses and the production of documents "relating to any 
matter under investigation" (§9), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §41 et seq. These powers have been 
characterized by the United States Supreme Court as comparable to those of a grand jury, 
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357 (1950). See Babcock, 
"Legal Investigation," A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, April 1-2, 1954, p. 157 at 158: 
"This combination of fact finding power represents the broadest power available to any 
agency of the government." 
4 A dissenting member states that not more than 10% of those who are asked for data 
refuse to cooperate, RllPORT 348. See T1Ml!ERG, THE ANrrrnusT LAws FROM THE POINT 
OF VIEw OF A GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY 32 (1949): " .••• defense counsel, in the 
majority of cases, pursue the path of voluntary cooperation." See also Nitschke, "Procedure 
in Antitrust Investigations," 1950 UNIV. ILL. L. FoRuM 593 at 595. On voluntary co-
operation generally see Wadmond, "Investigation," A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, 
August 18-19, 1954, p. 32 at 37. 
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is not always so, however, and at times without first trying other 
avenues, the department has taken the lawful though objectionable 
expedient of using the criminal grand jury process to investigate its 
prospective civil case. 5 
The committee strongly disapproves of use of the grand jury where 
criminal proceedings are not contemplated on the ground that this is 
a perversion of the grand jury system and "'debases the law by tarring 
respectable citizens with the brush of crime when their deeds involve 
no criminality."6 On the other hand, it states that this type of resort to 
the grand jury has been forced upon the department by lack of any 
adequate pre-complaint civil discovery alternative. 
To meet these problems, the committee proposes legislation au-
thorizing the attorney general to issue a "Civil Investigative Demand" 
upon corporations, partnerships or associations compelling the produc-
tion of documents. The documents demanded ( correspondence and 
other business records), would have to be "relevant to particular anti-
trust offenses stated to be under investigation," and the demand would 
have to "describe the records and data sought with reasonable specific-
ity."7 A Justice Department custodian would be established to pre-
serve the documents and they would be available for use only for the 
pending investigation, for submission to a grand jury or for ensuing 
Antitrust Division or Federal Trade Commission proceedings. The 
district courts would be vested with jurisdiction to order compliance 
with the demand, or to modify or set it aside upon a showing that the 
demand is unreasonable in scope, irrelevant with respect to the specific 
offenses under investigation, or inadequate in its description of the 
material required. The demand could apparently be served on any 
corporation, partnership or association, whether itself suspect or not, 
but it apparently could not be served on an individual. 
The proposed "demand" would be limited to documents and 
would not be available to compel the attendance and testimony of per-
sons. The committee registers its disapproval of any subpoena powers 
that would permit the summoning of witnesses by the attorney gen-
eral for interrogation under oath or generally require producµon of 
5 It seems improbable that any of the following huge recent civil cases, all of which 
began with grand jury investigations, were ever seriously intended as criminal prosecutions: 
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., (D.C. ill. 1954) 126 F. Supp. 235; 
United States v. Morgan, (D.C. N.Y. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 621; United States v. Armour 
& Co., complaint :filed Sept. 15, 1948, dismissed without prejudice (D.C. ill. 1954) CCH 
TRADB REc. REP., 10th ed., ,r66,117. 
6 fuPOR'l' 345. -
7 REPon'l' 346. 
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documents except within the limits defined in the proposal. Such 
power, the committee says, would be comparable to the "administra-
tive subpoena" used by the Federal Trade Commission and other 
regulatory agencies and would be "alien to our legal traditions, readily 
susceptible to grave abuse and, moreover, seems unnecessary."8 
It is not readily apparent to the present writer how the Civil In-
vestigative Demand proposal of the committee differs, other than in 
degree, from the "administrative subpoena" which the committee so 
strongly dislikes. Of course, the exclusion of the right to call witnesses 
is a substantial difference. But in most government antitrust cases, 
documentary evidence is the backbone of the complainant's case and 
testimony, especially of the defendant's own officers and employees, 
plays a distinctly secondary role. 9 Given the documentary power, it 
would seem that the Department of Justice, for most purposes, would 
as a practical matter be put in a position approximating that of the 
Federal Trade Commission. Nor does the requirement of "relevance" 
in the proposed demand seem more than a minor limitation. It would 
be an unimaginative prosecutor indeed who could not state the "spe-
cific antitrust offenses under jnvestigation" with sufficient breadth to 
insure production of all of the documents he could hope to use. 
The proposed demand lodges what would amount to an important 
subpoena power in an executive officer. Whatever the safeguards in-
tended by the proponents of such a grant of executive inquisitorial 
power, there would seem to be little to prevent the evolution of this 
investigative weapon into a virtual civil counterpart of the grand jury 
or of the Federal Trade Commission, without the special safeguards 
attached to those institutions. In the hands of an unrestrained prose-
cutor, this amount of personal power could readily fall into abus.e and 
become an instrument of harassment.10 
The committee's goal of taking the grand jury out of the civil anti-
trust arena is highly laudable. But there is no guarantee that this 
would result from the proposal.11 Even if the Civil Investigative 
s REPORT 345-346. 
9 See Nitschke, "Procedure in Antitrust Investigations," 1950 Umv. Iu. L. FoRuM 
593 at 596; HAMILTON AND TILL, ANTrrnuST IN ACTION, T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, 
49-50 (1941). In its case in chief in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 
(D.C. ill. 1954) 126 F. Supp. 235, the government called only two witnesses, but intro-
duced over 1,300 documents, A.B.A. Antitrust Section, REPORT OF CoM:MITTEB ON PRAc-
TICB AND PRocllDtrnB IN THE TRIAL oF ANTrrnuST CASns 105 (1954). 
10 "Several members" dissented from the committee recommendation for reasons sim-
ilar to those advanced in this article. REPORT 348. 
11 Cf. the views of one committee member who objected to the proposal because he 
saw it as a step to curtail the use of the grand jury. REPORT 348-349. 
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Demand were not in itself an objectionable extension of power, there 
is little assurance that its existence would "end the necessity for utilizing 
the grand jury process in civil antitrust investigations."12 Although 
the attorney general might perhaps feel under some moral obligation 
to avoid the use of the grand jury in a clear case, he may reasonably 
be uncertain at the beginning of the investigation as to whether the 
ultimate proceeding should be civil or criminal or both.13 And in any 
-case, it would not appear to be sound technique to let the execution 
of legislative intent depend upon a moral obligation not written into 
the law at all. The proposal does not insure correction of the evil 
which it seeks to correct. Instead it launches a new and unduly ex-
tensive addition to the already great investigative powers of the depart-
ment. 
The grand jury has undoubtedly been misused in the past. But 
it would be better to correct such misuse by legislation directly dealing 
with the problem. This proposal does not do that. Nor is it, on the 
other hand, vitally needed by the department. On balance, therefore, it 
would seem preferable to defer the creation of this extraordinary 
subpoena power in an executive officer at least until less drastic pos-
sibilities have been exhausted. 
2. The Decision to Proceed 
The Report observes that "the burdens of antitrust proceedings on 
all parties are generally so severe that litigation should be contemplated. 
only after investigation discloses a probable offense and in a civil case, 
only if the Department, after evaluation of all probable defenses, is 
convinced that effective relief is obtainable."14 
12 REPORT 347. 
13 See, e.g., the statement of government counsel in the "soap" case, United States v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 14 F.R.D. 230 at 233 (1953). According to the court, counsel 
stated that the grand jury was employed to secure "determination as to what action should 
be taken to enforce those laws through criminal proceedings, civil proceedings, or both." 
For discussion from the point of view of a government attorney, see Hollabaugh, ''Develop-
ment of an Antitrust Case," A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, April 1-2, 1954, p. 14 at 
19-22. 
14 REPORT 349. The record of government victories in antitrust cases in the past has 
been sufficiently spotty to suggest that the "probable offense" standard suggested by the 
committee has not always been observed. For figures, see HAMILTON AND TILL, A.Nn-
TRUST IN ACTION, T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, Appx. A-F (1941). Cf. the recent 
report of Assistant Attorney General Barnes: In the fiscal year 1954, the Antitrust Division 
brought to a close 48 civil and 18 criminal actions. 32 of the civil cases were disposed of by 
consent decree. Of the 12 which were litigated, the government won six and lost six. Four 
civil complaints were apparently dismissed by the government during the year. Of the 18 
criminal cases closed, 17 were disposed of by nolo contendere or guilty pleas. Barnes, Ad-
dress, A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, 22. 
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The Report then discusses standards that should be applied by the 
department in determining whether to institute criminal or civil pro-
ceedings or both. 
Criminal Proceedings. The Sherman Act is basically cast in the 
form of a criminal statute. Whether or not this was in keeping with 
the kinds of violation in the contemplation of the draftsmen of 1890, 
the steadily increasing economic emphasis of the act has rendered the 
criminal prosecution less and less appropriate. Yet despite a steady 
trend away from business conduct of the kind vy_hich could reason-
ably be dubbed "criminpl" in any realistic sense, the popularity of the 
criminal antitrust prosecution has continued unabated. From 1890 to 
date roughly half of all antitrust actions instituted by the Department 
of Justice have been criminal prosecutions.15 
The committee might well have recommended the outright aboli-
tion of the criminal prosecution as an outmoded device for Il!Odem 
business regulation.16 But the Report avoids any direct discussion of 
this problem, and only urges restraint in the use of the criminal pro-
secution. The great difficulty often confronting a businessman who 
attempts to determine in advance whether his projected actions will 
run afoul of the Sherman Act is properly stressed. And the recom-
mendation is made that "criminal process should be used only where 
the law is clear and the facts reveal a ,B.agrant offense and plain intent 
unreasonably to restrain trade."1.7 
The committee's appeal to enforcement authorities to exercise a 
reasoned discretion in the use of the power of criminal prosecution is 
certainly sound. This sort of executive restraint has not always been 
in evidence. Far too many indictments have been returned in areas 
where the law was unsettled or where the economic complexities of the 
15 See Cahill, ''Must We Brand American Business by Indictment as Criminal?" 
A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Sept. 17-18, 1952, 26 at 58. Slightly more than 
half of the cases instituted under the present administration since March 1953 have been 
criminal cases: See summaries in CCH TRADE REG. REP., 10th ed., ,i66,070 et seq. 
16 See Cahill, supra, note 15. Cf. HAMILTON AND T1LL, ANnntusT IN Ac:noN, 
T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16 (1941) p. 81: "Yet, as the matter stands today, the crim-
inal action is the law's most effective sanction." See also Berge, "Remedies Available to 
the Government under the Sherman Act," 7 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. Pnon. 104 (1940). On 
the trial of criminal antitrust cases, see Duncan, ''.The 'Big Case'-When Tried Criminally," 
4 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 99 (1953). 
17 REPORT 349. Two members recommended that the law be amended "so as to make 
criminal only acts of clear, certain and predatory violations of the law, and that the balance 
be left to civil relief, governmental and private." REPORT 353. The committee rejected this 
proposal as "impracticable." REPORT 351. 
1955] ANTITRUST ADMINISTRATION 1139 
case were such that trial in the atmosphere of a criminal indictment was 
highly improper.18 The Report specifies several such examples of 
abuse of the criminal process.19 
The Report quotes and generally endorses a statement of policy 
made to the committee by the present assistant attorney general in 
charge of the Antitrust Division stating that criminal prosecutions are 
now limited to (1) price fixing, (2) cases of specific intent to restrain 
trade or monopolize, (3) boycotts or other predatory practices, and ( 4) 
cases involving a second offense. The statement adds, however, that 
"the Division feels free to seek an indictment in any case where a 
prospective defendant has knowledge that practices similar to those in 
which he is engaging have been held to be in violation of the Sherman 
Act in a prior civil suit against other persons."20 
Apart from the rather ambiguous significance of the last-quoted 
sentence and the committee's caveat that ''a second offense need not 
warrant indictment," this statement of policy, if adhered to, should lay 
the groundwork for a substantial administrative limitation upon future 
criminal proceedings. 
One additional word of caution not made by the committee seems 
warranted. Even where the law and the facts are such as to justify 
indictment of a corporation, the criminal process should be used most 
sparingly against its executives and employees. The harm that indict-
ment brings to the individual may be irremediable even by subsequent 
dismissal or acquittal. 21 Good conscience should place the prosecutor 
under the strongest moral sanction to avoid planting the stigma of 
indictment upon the individual unless his participation in th~ viola-
tion has been clear, substantial and intentional.22 
In past years, the department has sometimes seemed more interested 
in the indictment of large numbers of individual defendants than in 
18 From 1890 to 1951, the government won only a little more than half of the crim-
inal antitrust cases which actually went to trial. Duncan, "The 'Big Case'-When Tried 
Criminally," 4 WEST. fus. L. fuv. 99 at 100 (1953). This record strongly suggests 
that the use of criminal process in many of these cases was improper. It is true that a high 
percentage of the criminal cases never go to trial but end in nolo rontendere pleas; but a 
good many of the latter pleas have doubtless been made by defendants who might well 
have won on trial but could not stand the enormous expense of a contest, Duncan, supra, 
at 108. 
19 fuPORT 351. 
20 REPORT 350. 
21 See Cahill, "Must We Brand American Business By Indictment As Criminal'?" 
A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Sept. 17-18, 1952, p. 26. 
22 Section 14 of the Clayton Act states that a criminal violation by a corporation "shall 
be deemed to be also that of the individual directors, officers, or agents of such corpora· 
tion who shall have authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in whole or 
in part such violation •••• " 38 Stat. L. 736 (1914) 15 U.S.C. (1952) §24. 
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their conviction. Sweeping criminal charges have been leveled at 
many more individuals than the department could possibly have hoped 
to convict under even the most favorable circumstances. In the Madi-
son Oil case,23 for example, a total of :fifty-six individuals were indicted. 
Only :five were ultimately held properly convicted, with ten others 
pleading nolo contendere. In another case, the indictment alleged 
violations in connection with the activities of a commodity exchange in 
upstate New York.24 Some of the indicted individuals had not been 
members of the Exchange, were not employees of any corporation that 
was a member, and as it subsequently developed, had been indicted 
merely because their names had been entered in an Exchange minute 
book as social visitors! These individuals were ultimately noll prossed, 
but not until they had incurred the expense of employing counsel and 
had suffered the embarrassment of newspaper publicity. 
In other cases, important nationally known executives have been 
-indicted and later acquitted or dismissed because there was little or no 
evidence of their personal knowledge of or responsibility for the viola-
tive corporate conduct.25 Experience indicates that it is very rare 
that more than a relatively few executives of a large corporation are 
ever sufficiently closely identified with offending corporate acts to war-
rant their individual indictment, and it should be the policy of the 
Antitrust Division to be even more careful in selecting individuals for 
indictment than in determining in the :first instance whether the facts 
warrant indictment at all.26 
Criminal and Civil Remedies. For criminal proceedings, the com-
mittee majority recommend an increase of the present maximum :fine 
under the Sherman Act from $5,000 to $10,000.27 A minority rec-
2s United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 8ll (1940). 
24United States v. Kraft Cheese Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1942) Case No. 641, CCH, FED-
ERAL A.NnntusT LAws: 55 individuals, 3 corporations and 1 trade associaton were in-
dicted. The indictment was noll prossed as to all hut 4 defendants, who pleaded nolo 
contendere. 
25 See, for example, United States v. General Motors Corp., (7th Cir. 1941) 121 
F. (2d) 376: 4 corporations and 19 individuals were indicted; the corporations were held, 
hut all of the individuals were acquitted or dismissed. In United States v. St. Louis Dairy 
Co., (D.C. Mo. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 12; Case 918, CCH, THE FEDERAL A.NnntusT LAws, 
two companies and six individuals were indicted; the companies were found guilty, hut the 
individuals were all acquitted. See also summary of criminal cases in Duncan, "The 'Big 
Case'-When Tried Criminally," 4 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 99 at 116-121 (1953). 
26 In the past few years, the policy of the Antitrust Division has apparently become 
more careful in this respect. For example, in the recent case of United States v. Kansas 
City Star Co., (D.C. Mo. 1955) CCH TRADE REG. RE.e., 10th ed., ,r66,062, 1f 66,162, 
one corporation and only two individuals were indicted; even so, one of the individuals 
was later dismissed. 
27 REPORT 352. 
1955] ANTITRUST ADMINISTRATION II41 
ommend an increase to $50,000, the amount proposed by Attorney 
General Brownell and embodied in a bill now pending in Congress.28 
While a fine of $5,000 may be of no moment to a large corporation~ 
it may be a heavy penalty for an individual executive or employee~ 
particularly since it is not a deductible expense for federal income tax 
purposes. 29 Any dollar ceiling in excess of the present maximum 
could work a grave injustice in the latter case while it would not con-
stitute a significant difference in the former. Therefore, it is some-
what doubtful whether any increase in the criminal fine is really 
called for. Also it is the fact of indictment and conviction that fre-
quently constitutes the real penalty.3° Further, the evidence of re-
cent judicial attitudes suggests that there is no need for an increase. 
The Report points out that the average fine actually imposed by judges 
in all cases in the past eight years has been only $2,600, there being 
numerous fines of only $500 or less. As stated earlier in this article, 
the criminal prosecution as a means of business regulation should be 
de-emphasized; a radical increase in the criminal penalty might have 
the opposite effect. Under the circumstances, the committee's- rec-
1 ommendation is entirely adequate. 31 
The only civil remedies discussed are the most drastic · ones-
divorcement, dissolution and divestiture.32 The committee points out 
that in only twenty-four litigated cases throughout the 65-year history 
of the Sherman Act have the courts entered decrees for these forms of 
relief, and as might be expected, twenty of those cases were merger or 
28 H. R. 3659, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955), increasing the penalty to $50,000, has 
passed the House at this writing and has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
CCH TRADB REc. REP., No. 19, April 7, 1955, p. 3. President Eisenhower's Economic 
Report to the 84th Congress recommended that the maximum fine be raised "substantially." 
Attorney General Brownell in letters to the Senate and House asked for an increase to 
$50,000, stating that the deterrent effect of the present maximum $5,000 fine against 
a large corporation is "almost negligible except for the stigma of conviction." CCH TRADB 
REc. REP., No. 13, Jan. 27, 1955, p. 2. 
29 Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (2d Cir. 
1931) 47 F. (2d) 178; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
(8th Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 372. 
30 The majority observed that " •••. the deterrent effect on a respected businessman 
of any criminal indictment cannot be ignored." REPORT 352. At another point, two mem-
bers pointed out: "The stigma of indictment tends to be the real punishment." RBPoRT 
353, quoting Former Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge. 
31 It should be noted that $5,000 is not always the maximum penalty assessable against 
a given defendant. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 
1125 (1946), the Court upheld fines of $15,000 imposed on each defendant under sep-
arate counts of conspiracy in restraint of trade, monopolizing, and conspiracy to monopolize; 
the three counts all rested on the same facts; total fines in the case were $255,000. 
32 See also the discussion of remedies in the Patent section of the REPORT, pp. 255-
259. 
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close-knit combination cases.33 The Report quotes from the recent 
Timken case that since "divestiture is a remedy to restore competition 
and not to punish those who restrain trade, it is not to be used indis-
criminately, without regard to the type of violation or whether other 
effective methods, less harsh, are available."34 
This "judicial restraint" is firmly approved by the committee, and 
with good reason. Surgery, whether medical or antitrust, is inherently 
a remedy of last resort. The risks attending it, the difficulty of its ex-
ecution and the shock which it inevitably brings all require that it be 
used with the utmost caution. All other less drastic methods of com-
petitive restoration must be first considered. The committee urges the 
Antitrust Division to seek these remedies only if the tests of clear 
necessity, practicability and basic fairness are met. And the division 
is advised to consider the effects of a possible resultant disruption upon 
the industry involved, its markets and the public needs in time of 
peace and war. It is emphasized that such an appraisal "seems a prime 
responsibility of any antitrust enforcement agency." 
A few members attack the Supreme Court's Timken opinion for its 
"solicitude" for the "right of amalgamation"35 and label the 11:?-ajority 
as "even hostile to the breaking up of monopolies when they have 
been proved illegal."36 There would seem to be no basis whatever for 
this characterization of the Report. In the very few cases in which an 
outright illegal monopoly has been found to exist, the courts have taken 
the necessary steps, and the Report does not suggest that anything 
different should have been done.37 
33 REPORT 354. On these remedies generally, see Oppenheim, "Divestiture as a Rem• 
edy Under the Federal Antitrust Laws-Economic Background,'' 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
119 (1950); Timberg, "Justifications for Divestitute,'' id. at 132; Van Cise, "Limitations 
on Divestiture," id. at 147. Brown, ''Injunctions and Divestiture,'' A.B.A. Antitrust 
Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, 129 at 138. Cf. Adams, "Dissolution, Divorcement, 
Divestiture: the Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust,'' 27 IND. L. J. I (1951). 
MTimken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at 603, 71 S.Ct. 971 
(1951). 
35 The implication of the dissent seems to be that the committee approved the refusal 
of the Court to order divestiture in the Timken case. The committee approved the gen-
eral language quoted above in the text, but at another place in the Report the committee 
states that the "obvious remedy should have been dissolution" in the Timken case. REPORT 
36. See Adelman, "General Comment on the Schwartz Dissent," I ANn-rnusT BULLE· 
TIN 71 at 77 (1955). 
36REPORT 357. 
37 See REPoRT·354. And see the discussion of §2 of the Sherman Act in the REroRT'-
p. 43 et seq. 
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3. Consent Settlement Procedures 
Settlement is a much-desired goal in any kind of litigation. In 
antitrust it is of unusual importance. To the government it means 
greater economy and broader enforcement, and to the defendants it 
may mean an opportunity to avoid a protracted expensive trial attended 
by unfavorable publicity and potentially to be followed by treble 
damage litigation.38 The Report notes that from 1935 to date 72 per-
cent of the civil actions brought by the government were terminated 
by consent, emphasizes the need for workable procedures, and rec-
ommends several methods for their improvement. 
The Report endorses the use of negotiations in advance of £.ling of 
a complaint. The Antitrust Division has recently experimented with 
this approach and the present head of the division has stated that by 
this method he hopes to "promote Hexibility and ease compromise in the 
process of decree negotiation."39 A complaint may harden the contro-
versy and deter settlement. And time and money may be consumed 
in trial preparation and preliminary court proceedings before settle-
ment is reached. The new procedure is a good one and deserves sup-
port. 
The committee criticizes the established practice of the department 
in requiring defendants to submit the initial draft of a consent d~cree in 
settlement negotiations and recommends that the department revise 
this practice in the future by submitting an initial draft "in response to 
a good faith request by defendants." The reason for the present policy 
apparently stems from the fear of the department that it will be ac-
cused of threatening or starting litigation to force a settlement. Per-
haps it has accordingly been thought that the initial step in formalizing 
negotiations by submitting a draft decree must be taken by the de-
fendants. 40 But as long as criminal proceedings are not used to coerce 
civil settlements, the department would be above criticism in submitting 
the initial draft as recommended by the committee. The committee's 
The dissenting members recommend the creation of a new agency to be called the 
"Federal Free Enterprise Commission" to be granted some very great powers and to take 
some powers from the Federal Trade Commission and the attorney general. This sug-
gestion would merely further complicate the already somewhat anomalous situation of 
two existing enforcemeµt agencies and was rightly not approved by a majority of the com-
mittee. 
38 See Barnes, "Settlement by Consent Judgment,'' AB.A. Antitrust Section Pro-
ceedings, April 1-2, 1954, p. 8; Horsky, "Settlement," id. Aug. 18-19, 1954, p. 102. 
39 Barnes, supra note 38, at 12. 
40 See Berge, ''Remedies Available to the Government Under the Sherman Act,'' 
7 I.Aw AND CoNJ.'.EM. PnoB. 104 at 108 (1940). 
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proposal if adopted would avoid guesswork by the defendants as to 
what the department is really interested in, and would shorten negotia-
tions and decrease expense. It should be adopted. 
4. Trial 
The Report deals only briefly with four general issues concerning 
the conduct of trials. It' recommends (I) that one judge should be 
assigned throughout a given case for all purposes; (2) that the issues 
to be tried be defined with as great particularity as possible before trial 
with the use of pre-trial conferences, motions for more definite state-
ment, interrogatories calling for statement of the issues and pre-trial 
statement of the issues as a prelude to extensive use of discovery; (3) 
that the Oregon State Medical Society opinion41 be the guide in limit-
ing the proof of events long since past; and ( 4) that certain types of 
issues be segregated and tried separately in the interest of efficiency. 
These and many other trial problems are more fully treated in the 
Judicial Conference Report on Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other 
Protracted Cases42 and in the report of the American Bar Association 
Anti-Trust Section Committee on Practice and Procedure in the Trial 
of Anti-Trust Cases.43 The suggested assignment of one judge to a 
given case for all purposes would seem to be elementary good sense 
in these complex cases and it is standard practice in many districts. The 
full use of devices in advance of trial to particularize the issues, if fairly 
done, may help considerably in reducing time and expense and in 
facilitating a wise decision. And the segregation of certain issues for 
separate trial is sound procedure.44 
The treatment which the Report gives to the problem of limiting the 
period of time prior to the filing of the complaint as to which proof 
may be made, however, would seem to deserve special comment here. 
The committee recommends that in all civil proceedings, including 
treble damage suits, the Oregon State Medical Society opinion "should 
be the guide wher~ the proof offered by either party reaches back more 
than a reasonable number of years."45 There follows the statement 
41 United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 72 S.Ct. 690 (1952). 
42 13 F.R.D. 62 (1951). 
43 REPORT oF THE CoMMITTEE oN PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE rn THE TRIAL oF 
ANnntuST CASHs OF THE SncnoN OF ANnntusT LAw OF THE .AMEmcAN BAR AssoCIA-
TION (1954). See generally the bibliography at pp. 58-60 of that report. 
44 On pre-trial problems, see Chadwell, "Pre-Trial," A.B.A.. Antitrust Section Pro-
ceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, p. 52. On trial problems, see Day, "Trial,'' A.B.A. Anti-
trust Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, p. 65. 
45 REPORT 364. The Report recommends that its guides be used also in criminal pro-
ceedings, where appropriate. 
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that "if that case's teaching is not followed by trial counsel, the court 
should by pretrial order limit the proof" in accordance with certain 
guides set forth in the Report, and that "in appropriate cases, a pretrial 
order should fix a cut-off date for proof." 
The Oregon State Medical Society decision is certainly auftiority 
that "archeology" and "ancient history" should be cut to _th_e bone.46 
But the opinion itself offers little or no "guide" for procedure in future 
cases. The proof of past misdeeds of the defendants from I 936 to 
I 94 I was in the record in that case and the proofs were closed before 
the court rejected this old evidence as irrelevant to the claim for present 
injunctive relief. Thus the expense and time involved in defending 
against stale evidence had been incurred, and the potentiality of con-
fusion of the legitimate issues to the prejudice of the defense was al-
ready serious. It will be impossible to know in advance of trial whether 
counsel will follow the "teaching" of this case. But if a meanjngful 
limitation of proof is to be accomplished, a_s it certainly should be in 
many cases, procedures must be followed which will establish the 
principles of the limitation, and possibly an actual cut-off date, in 
advance of trial so that preparation may be ma~e accordingly and the 
possibility of prejudice at the trial, particularly before a jury, may be 
avoided. 
In this respect the Report is a weakened version of the recom-
mendations of the Committee on Practice and Procedure of the 
American Bar Association,47 both in its lack of clarity with respect to 
general procedure to be followed and in its failure forthrightly to call 
for establishment of a cut-off date wherever possible. It is to be hoped 
that the courts will bolster the Report of the Attorney General's Com-
mittee with the recommendations of the American Bar Association 
Committee. Pursuant to these latter recommendations, the period of 
inquiry should be defined and limited by the trial judge in conference 
prior to trial. The plaintiff should be required to present evidence 
tending to show a case of present violations of law, at least within a 
period of five or six years prior to the filing of the complaint before 
being permitted to introduce evidence of an earlier period as to origins 
or background of the conspiracy. And when the circumstances permit, 
the court should establish a strict cut-off date, forbidding introduction 
46 United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 72 S.Ct. 690 (1952), 
noted in 38 A.B.A.J. 764 (1952), 66 HARV. L. Rnv. 89 at 139 (1952). The government 
introduced evidence of conspiratorial activity from 1936 to 1941; abandonment of the 
activity after 1941 was shown; the lower court refused to attach significance to the earlier 
misconduct in light of the abandonment, and the Supreme Court upheld this ruling. 
47 See note 43 supra. 
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of any evidence of activities of defendants prior to that date.48 Any-
thing less than these procedures will provide little insurance against 
the continuation of the wasteful prejudicial practice of seeking future 
relief upon the basis of ancient and long-since abandoned corporate 
mistakes. 49 
5. Compliance With and Modi-fication of Antitrust Judgments 
The committee urges the Department of Justice to conduct regular 
studies to determine whether its judgments "have been effective to 
restore competition," and suggests use of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion for this purpose.50 The committee, apparently by unanimous 
agreement, also recommends that the department "should consent to 
judgment modification where the defendant can show that a change 
in circumstances makes its continuation unchanged incompatible with 
antitrust goals."51 A decree which outlives its usefulness and impairs 
legitimate competitive activity may be as harmful to the antitrust policy 
as the lack of enforcement of a needed decree. But it is pointed out 
that in the past the department has refused to agree to substantial 
modification of even the broadest decree provisions under any cir-
cumstances. 52 
The committee recommendation on modification is important. In-
justice has existed in past procedures, and the ~epartment' s reluctance 
to consent to modifications constitutes a deterrent to consent decree 
settlements. Lawyers negotiating consent decrees must contend with 
the justifiable fear that a decree once entered may rapidly acquire im-
mortality irrespective of later changes in competitive conditions. This 
fear is frequently so substantial as to prevent settlement, whereas if 
fair consideration of future requests for modification could be assured, 
the settlement might be agreed to. The department need sacrifice none 
of its powers in carrying out the committee's recommendation. All 
that is required is a demonstration of a willingness to negotiate changes 
where antitrust goals will be promoted. 
48See Chadwell, ''Pre-Trial,'' A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, 
p. 52 at 58. 
49 Cf. Kramer, "Some Procedural Problems in Protracted Antitrust Trials,'' U. of 
Mich. Law School Summer Institute, FEDERAL ANnntusT LAws 302 at 307-308 (1953). 
50 REPORT 366. Section 6(c) of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the 
commission, upon application of the attorney general, to investigate and report upon how 
antitrust decrees are being carried out. 
51 REPORT 366. 
52 See, generally, Kilgore, "Antitrust Judgments and Their Enforcement,'' A.B.A. 
Antitrust Section Proceedings, April 1-2, 1954, p. 102 at 124-127. 
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In this connection, the committee commends a provision recently 
devised by the department for future decrees under which defendants 
may, after a stated period of time, show that conditions have changed 
so that the relief specified in the decree is no longer necessary. Also 
commended is another recently designed provision expressly providing 
for expiration of certain terms of the decree after a stated period of time. 
These provisions are for use in decrees which ban otherwise lawful 
conduct in order to dissipate the effects of unlawful practices, and are 
not of general application for all decrees. They evidence, however, a 
trend toward a general modification practice which would more nearly 
comport with the over-all recommendation of the committee. 
B. The Federal Trade Commission 
The Report is unaccountably brief with respect to Federal Trade 
Commission activities. "Committee attention . . . has focused onJy on 
(1) The Trade Practice Conference, (2) informal settlement proce-
dures, and (3) problems of enforcement of Commission orders and 
penalties for violation."53 The administration and enforcement sec-
tion thus parallels the substantive sections of the Report, which devote 
little attention to Federal Trade Commission rulings, especially under 
the "unfair methods of competition" proscriptions of section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act. It is not made clear whether this 
silence indicates general approval of the commission side of the anti-
trust picture, or whether the committee simply was unable in the al-
lotted time to make an adequate study of commission practice. In 
point of fact, it is probable that at least as many antitrust proceedings 
take place before the commission as before the courts. Although many 
of the problems in commission hearings are the S?me as in judicial 
proceedings, substantial differences exist, arising from the fact that 
the commission is a law-making as well as law-enforcing agency and 
conducts its hearings under the administrative rather than the judicial 
process. 
The committee may readily be forgiven for not launching into a 
detailed study of the maze of inner workings of the administrative proc-
ess as applied to antitrust cases. It is interesting to note, however, 
that shortly after release of the committee report, another agency, the 
Hoover Commission, issued a report calling for a complete separation 
53Juu,onT 369. 
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of the prosecuting and adjudication functions of the Federal Trade 
Commission. 54 The Hoover Commission Report states: 
'Where the proceeding before the administrative agency is 
strictly judical in nature, and the remedy afforded by the agency 
is one characteristically granted by courts, there can be no effective 
protection of private rights unless there is a complete separation of 
the prosecuting functions from the functions of decision."55 
The Hoover Report proposes the creation of a new "Administrative 
Court of the United States" to be composed of a Tax Section, a Trade 
Section and a Labor Section, to take over the decisional functions now 
exercised by federal agencies operating within the indicated fields. 
Apparently, if this proposal were adopted, the commission would con:-
tinue to issue complaints and prosecute them under the Federal Trade 
Commission and Clayton Acts. Hearings, however, would be before 
the new court and the court would issue or deny the requested cease 
and desist or other orders. 
The adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act of 194656 re-
sulted in long strides toward correction of evils inherent in combina-
tion of prosecuting and judicial functions in a single agency. Under 
this law, Hearing Examiners in Federal Trade Commission cases have 
acquired an independence which they did not previously enjoy, and 
have exhibited a commendable objectivity and judiciousness in con-
sideration of contested matters. These improvements have been 
further enhanced by the work of Chairman Howrey and the other 
members of the present commission, which has greatly increased the 
stature of that agency in recent years. Adoption of the Hoover Com-
mission proposal could carry even further the improvements already 
made. However, there are a number of conllicting considerations in-
herent in this important proposal which cannot be discussed in this 
article and it is unfortunate that the distinguished group of antitrust 
lawyers comprising the Attorney General's Committee did not address 
themselves to this difficult and vital question. 
The proposals which the committee makes as to Federal Trade 
. Commission practice and procedure are all quite reasonable. Im-
provements in Trade Practice Conference procedures are suggested. 
The new commission settlement procedure is approved. Legislative 
54 REPORT OF COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE 
GoVERNMBNT, "Legal Services and Procedure," 84-88 (1955). 
55 Id. at 85. 
56 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001 et seq. 
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change is proposed to eliminate the outlandish $5,000 per day penalty 
for violation of final Federal Trade Commission Act orders. And it 
is also proposed to remove the present inconsistency between the Clay-
ton and Federal Trade Commission Acts by making Clayton Act cease 
and desist orders become final after a lapse of time as do Commission 
Act orders. These changes should all be adopted.57 
C. Related Jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission 
The committee endorses the present system · of dual agency en-
forcement of the antitrust laws. It seems likely that were a completely 
fresh start being made, the somewhat anomalous dual enfor~ement 
procedure would be replaced by a single integrated system. Within 
the framework of existing law, however, the committee finds accept-
able procedures for coordination of the two agencies and for elimina-
tion of inconsistent or overlapping action. The two agencies today 
maintain fairly effective liaison, and the committee urges further 
improvements in cooperation and consultation. 
The committee's final word on this matter should be faithfully 
observed: "It is basic to all relations between the two agencies that 
both should never for any reason, including differences in views as 
to the law or the facts, proceed against the same parties for the same 
offense growing out of the same factual situation."58 
D. Private Antitrust Suits 
Private suits are unquestionably an important adjunct of antitrust 
enforcement and are the principal means whereby persons injured by 
antitrust violations may be recompensed. As the Report notes, until 
the past ten years, treble damage suits were most often unsuccessful.59 
In recent years, however, there has been a "burgeoning" of these suits, 
with numerous huge treble damage recoveries and awards of attorney's 
57 fu.POR'l' 369-374. 
58 REPOR'l' 377. The committee doubtless had in mind the proceedings instituted by 
both agencies against the cement industry for use of the basing point system. See Federal 
Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948). 
59 REPOR'l' 378. 
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fees. 60 Were the substantial law settled and all violations of it willful 
in character, few would quarrel with the present requirement of man-
datory trebling of the plaintiff's damages. 
It is manifest, however, that the numerous ambiguities and vagaries 
of the law expose the totally unwitting violator to the c;ontinued peril 
of huge damage penalties for what to him reasonably seem normal and 
honest business practices. This peril is especially great with respect to 
liability under the Robinson-Patman Act, but it lurks as well in many 
other areas of antitrust law. In private law, punitive damages for 
tortious conduct are aw.arded only where malice, or at least willfulness 
is present; actual damages are the law's only exaction from the merely 
negligent wrongdoer.61 Similarly, under other federal statutes which 
allow more than actual damages, the imposition of amounts in excess 
of actual damages is made discretionary with the court. 62 The inflexible 
penalizing of antitrust defendants in private suits is unwarranted by 
the nature of the substantive law and often leads to unconscionable 
results. . 
To rectify the situation while retaining the treble penalty for the 
knowing violator, the committee recommends enactment of legislation 
making the doubling or trebling of damages discretionary with the 
court. 63 The Report states: 
"On balance, we favor vesting in the trial judge discretion to 
impose double or treble damages. In all instances, this would rec-
ompense injured parties. Beyond compensation, tl,ie trial court 
could then pen?lize the purposeful violator without imposing the 
harsh penalty of multiple damages on inriocent actors."64·· 
The committee acknowledges the difficulty of laying down any precise 
standard for the judge's determination and recom:rpends that the mat-
ter be left to hi? discretion, as it is under other statutes with similar 
provisions. 
60 REPORT 378. For exhaustive discussion and statistics, see comment, 61 YALE L. J. 
1010 (1952). 
61 PnossER, ToRTs 11-13 (1941). 
62 Housing and Rent Act, 61 Stat. L. 199 (1947), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 
(1952) §1895. Defense Production Act, 64 Stat. L. 811 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. 
App. (1952) §2109(c); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. (1952) §§1, IOI(e); Patent Act, 35 
U.S.C.A. (1952) §284; Trademark Act, 60 Stat. L. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. (1952) 
§1117. 
63 A bill now in Congress would effect this change: H.R. 4958, 84th Cong., 1st 
sess. (1955), introduced on March 15, 1955, by Congressman Walter, and referred to 
the House Committee on the Judiciary. 
64fuPORT 379. 
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This recommendation, though dissented to by several members, 
seems entirely reasonable and contains no serious threat to the con-
tinued effectiveness of the private suit. Ability of the plaintiff to 
prove violation and recover both actual damages and attorney's fees is 
not affected, and modem liberalized rules of damages supply ample 
lure to provide incentive to sue without the added windfall of punitive 
recoveries. Nor, as the committee notes, will the recommended change 
affect the conduct of potential defendants. The unwitting violator 
is not affected by the threat of damages, for he does not know his peril. 
The willful violator, on the other hand, may be held for treble damages 
as in the past. It is to be hoped that Congress will act promptly on 
this recommendation. 
The Report contains three other important proposals for change 
in the private suit aspects of the law. A federal four-year statute of 
limitations is recommended to bring much-needed order out of the 
existing confusion resulting from the lack of a federal statute and the 
consequent application of state law.65 Modifications in section 5 of 
the Clayton Act, providing for use of evidence of government judg-
ments in related private actions and tolling of the statute of limitations 
during the pendency of government actions, are recommended. 66 And 
legislation is urged authorizing the United States itself to recover 
actual damages for violations directly affecting the government. 67 
These recommendations constitute perfecting amendments to existing 
law to resolve present inconsistencies in the availability of the private 
action. They are sensible and should be adopted. 
Conclusion 
The gigantic character of antitrust litigation assures that vexatious 
problems of administration and procedure will always persist. But the 
Report of the committee demonstrates that many rational reforms are 
possible. The committee properly rejects the idea that the American 
judicial system is incapable of absorbing and successfully managing 
65 H.R. 4954, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955), providing for a uniform four-year statute 
of limitations, has been passed by the House and sent to the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary at this writing. 
66 REPORT 380 et seq. 
67 H.R. 4954 in the present Congress would give this right to the government by over-
ruling United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 61 S.Ct. 742 (1941). 
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the ''big case."68 While some of its recommendations are controversial, 
in the main the Report offers a blueprint for substantial increase in the 
effectiveness and fairness of antitrust administration. 
68 REPORT 366. 
